Oligopoly Problems

Oligopoly Problems (Note that second page has some partial answers so that you can check yourself. I think these are correct, but I did it quickly. So I will offer one bonus take per mistake for the low person who finds the mistake in my answers with a level best of 3 points per student. ) 1) Demand is given by P=100-Q/2. Two debaucheds struggle gibe to the Cournot model and each has TC=10q. What loot does each truehearted earn?How would your answer change if the second firm observed the first firms decision (this is the Stackleberg problem)? 2) Demand is given by P=80-2Q. There are three identical firms each with TC=10. go on the profit of a firm if they each pick quantity simultaneously (Cournot). Find the Profit of a firm if the each pick bell simultaneously (Bertrand). 3) Suppose there are n firms that compete according to the Cournot model and that each has MC = C. If demand is given by P=A-BQ, what winnings will a firm earn?What would a compact do? 4) Factory 1 has TC=20q +10 and Factory 2 has TC=10q. If both(prenominal) factories are be givend by rivals who compete according to the Cournot model, what profits would each earn assuming that demand is given by P=180-Q? If this was one firm (a cartel) what would it do (hint if the one firm decided to operate both factories it would want MC to be the same at both locations or else it could increase profits my shifting where it produced)? 5) Firm 1s demand is given by P=49-q1+0. 5q2 and Firm 2s demand is given by P=49-q2+0. 25q1. If TC=q2 +5 for each, what profit will each firm earn? What kinds of goods are the two firms selling? 1) q1=60 and q2=60 for Cournot while q1=90 and q2 = 45 for Stackleberg. 2) Under Cournot, q1= q2 = q3 =10. Under Bertrand, the firms will push price down to 0. 3) for each one firm will produce q = (A-C)/B(n+1) under the Cournot solution. 4) In the competitive situation, q1=50 and q2= 60. 5) Each firm would make q=13. 07.